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I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been relatively little interest in the rights of the accused before 
international criminal courts.2 This can be explained, in part, by the unsavory 
background of a large number of the persons accused and the severity of the 
crimes alleged, as well as by overwhelming concern for the rights of the 
victims.3 It also can be explained by the reversal, in the international context, 
of the typical left/right domestic political alignment on prosecutorial 
prerogatives. 4 Proponents of the creation of a permanent international 
institution devoted to the prosecution of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity come mostly from the political left, the domain of the so-
called "soft-on-crime" liberals who tend to think more about the rights of the 
accused.5 In their bid for an effective court, they have, contrary to type, taken 
a position in favor of a strong prosecutor-a stance in tension with the rights 
of the accused. On the other hand, the opponents of international criminal 
tribunals, or at least the International Criminal Court (ICC), usually come 
from the political right, hardly the haven of the Alan Dershowitzes of the 
world. Their background makes them, in general, less sensitive to defendants' 
rights, and their goal, in any case, is preventative, not ameliorative. Lack of 
interest in the rights of the accused can also be ascribed to the attraction, for 
advocates, detractors, the media, and academics, of other important questions 
raised by international criminal law. For example, significant disagreement 
exists about whether the international criminal process (or a trial at all) is the 
best means to achieve justice for these sorts of crimes;6 whether the United 
2. These courts are, presently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). I speak here, as well, of the future 
International Criminal Court (ICC). I do not discuss the possible future tribunals for Cambodia and 
Sierra Leone. 
3. See, e.g., Michael Bachrach, The Protectionand Rights of Victims Under International 
CriminalLaw, 34 INT'L LAW. 7 (2000); Theo van Boven, The Positionofthe Victim in the Statuteof the 
InternationalCriminal Court, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF ADRIAAN Bos 77 (Herman A.M. von Hebel et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS ON 
THE ICC]. 
4. See Henri Astier, Rights of the Despised,AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2000, at 30. But cf. 
Bruce Broomhall, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Letter to the Editor, AM. PROSPECT, Sept, 11, 
2000, at 6. 
5. NGOs have been unusually silent with regard to the rights of defendants before 
international courts. Some have considered the issue, often under the rubric of making these courts 
effective. See Pre-TrialRights in the Rules ofProcedureand Evidence, INT'L CRIM. COURT BRIEFING 
SERIES (Lawyers Comm. for Hum. Rts., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1999; AMNESTY INT'L, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS, 1.2 (1998); LAWYERS COMM. FOR 
HUM. RTS., FAIRNESS TO DEFENDANTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: PROPOSALS TO 
STRENGTHEN THE DRAFT STATUTE AND ITS PROTECTION OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS (1996); see also 
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., WHAT IS A FAIR TRIAL? A BASIC GUIDE TO LEGAL STANDARDS AND 
PRACTICE (2000). As a consequence, the main advocate for the rights of the accused has been the 
International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association. E.g., Elise Groulx, Presentation on the Rights of 
the Accused Before the ICTY (Nov. 7-8, 1998), available at http://www.hri.ca/partners/aiad-
icdaa/reports/belgrade.htm. 
6. See, e.g., MARTHA MiNOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY 
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Jos6 E. 
Alvarez, Crimes ofStates/CrimesofHate:Lessonsfrom Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999); Mark 
A. Drumbl, Punishment,Postgenocide:From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1221 (2000). 
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States should sign7 and ratify8 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court;9 whether the future permanent court should have jurisdiction over 
° nationals of non-States-Parties; 1 and how the substantive criminal law of the 
future court and the current ad hoc tribunals should be defined.' Finally, the 
absence of interest in defendants' rights can be attributed to the probable 
assumption that any international criminal tribunal created by the efforts of so 
many thoughtful people, modeled on Western legal systems, and run by 
upstanding individuals, will, of course, adhere to the highest standards of 
propriety and fairness.' 2 For these reasons, the question "Can international 
criminal courts provide defendants with fair trials?" is one that has barely 
been posed, let alone answered.' 
3 
7. The United States signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, the last day possible 
for doing so. See Steven Lee Myers, US Signs Treatyfor World Court to Try Atrocities,N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 2001, atA1. 
8. See, e.g., Written Statement of Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr. before the 
Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States 
Senate, (July 23, 1998), available at 1998 WL 12762551 [hereinafter Casey & Rivkin, Foreign 
Relations Statement]; Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the InternationalCriminal 
Court:A BriefResponse, 31 N.Y.U. I. INT'L L. & POL. 855 (1999); COUNCIL. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? THREE OPTIONS AS PRESIDENrIAL SPEECHES (1999) 
availableat http://www.cfr.orgtpublic/pubs/CriminalCourtCPL.html; Ruth Wedgwood, The Constitution 
and the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE ICC]; Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an 
InternationalCriminalCourt,33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (1995); Scott W. Andreasen, Note, The 
InternationalCriminalCourt:Does the ConstitutionPrecludeIts Ratificationby the UnitedStates?, 85 
IOWAL. REV. 697 (2000). 
9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1998), 37 
I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
10. See, e.g., Casey & Rivkin, Foreign Relations Statement, supranote 8; Eve La Haye, The 
JurisdictionoftheInternationalCriminalCourt: Controversiesover the PreconditionsforExercisingIts 
Jurisdiction,46 NETH. INT'L L. REv 1 (1999); Madeline Morris, High Crimes andMisconceptions:The 
ICCandNon-party States, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 219 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's 
Jurisdictionoverthe NationalsofNon-party States, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE ICC, supra note 8, 
at 213. 
11. See, e.g., MARK J. OSiEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, AND THE 
LAW OF WAR (1999); Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in DecisionsandIndictments ofthe Yugoslav and 
Rwandan tribunals: CurrentStatus, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 97 (1999); Simon Chesterman, An Altogether 
Different Order: Defining the Elements of CrimesAgainstHumanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307 
(2000); Grant M. Dawson, DefiningSubstantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the 
InternationalCriminalCourt: What isthe Crime ofAggression?, 19 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
413 (2000); Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes 
Against Humanity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 335 (2000); Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The 
Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourtVersus CustomaryInternationalLaw, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 
172 (1999). 
12. Of course, the discussion in this Article should not be taken as a negative commentary on 
the motivations or capabilities of the advocates of, or current or future participants in, the international 
criminal tribunals. 
13. On the right to a fair trial generally in international law, see David Harris, The Right to 
FairTrialin CriminalProceedingsas a HumanRight, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 352 (1967). There are a 
few pieces that focus on the general question of fair trials in connection with the ad hoc tribunals and the 
future ICC. Eg., James Sloan, The InternationalCriminalTribunalfor theFormerYugoslavia andFair 
TrialRights: A Closer Look, 9 LEIDEN I INT'L L. 479 (1996); Colin Warbrick, InternationalCriminal 
CourtsandFairTrial,3 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 45 (1998); Michatl Wladimiroff RightsofSuspects and 
Accused, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE 
EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 415 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia 
Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000); Vincent M. Creta, Comment, The Search for Justice in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute and the Rules of 
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Once raised, however, the centrality of the question to the enterprise of 
international criminal justice cannot be doubted, and rarely is. If trials are 
unfair, or perceived to be unfair, international criminal courts-the two ad hoe 
tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the 
future permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)-might quickly lose 
their legitimacy. Worse still, the entire enterprise of justice for these types of 
heinous crimes, whether in international courts, domestic courts, or otherwise, 
might be dealt a serious blow. As Richard Goldstone, first Chief Prosecutor 
for the ad hoc tribunals, has commented, "Whether there are convictions or 
whether there are acquittals will not be the yardstick [of the ICTY]. The 
measure is going to be the fairness of the proceedings ...."14 
Yet, there are additional, sometimes countervailing, considerations that 
make the concept of fair trials particularly complex for international criminal 
courts. One of these is accountability. The extreme character of the crimes 
alleged before international criminal courts makes the case for accountability 
stronger than in domestic prosecutions. Added to the heightened influence of 
accountability is the enduring pertinence of state sovereignty. While the 
tribunals mark an historic encroachment on sovereignty, there remain strong 
and legitimate interests in maintaining many of the powers and prerogatives of 
states. These state interests (national security, most obviously) are often in 
tension with fair trial standards. In turn, the absence of a strong community of 
"watchdog" observers for fair trial proceedings serves to underpin these 
powerful interests. Thus, the realm of international criminal justice is 
distinguished from domestic criminal justice not simply because 
accountability and sovereignty weigh heavier in this context, but also because 
of the absence of an effective counterweight to check these interests. So while 
the idea of fair trials is hardly controversial in and of itself, the application of 
this idea to international crimes in international settings is more complex. 
The fair trial question can be approached in at least two ways.' First, are 
the substantive rights accorded to the accused adequate? This approach 
focuses on the rights delineated in the tribunals' statutes, rules of procedure 
and evidence, and case law-for example, the right to confront witnesses or 
ProcedureandEvidence of the InternationalCriminalTribunalforthe FormerYugoslavia, 20 HOUS. J. 
INT'L L. 381 (1998); Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused andthe 
InternationalCriminalTribunalforthe FormerYugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 111 (1998). On how 
increasing international law-enforcement cooperation may have an impact on the rights ofthe accused in 
national courts, see Diane Marie Amann, The Rights of the Accused in a Global EnforcementArena, 6 
ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 555 (2000); and Robert J.Currie, HumanRights and InternationalMutual 
LegalAssistance:Resolving the Tension, 11 CRiM.L. F. 143 (2000). 
14. Mark S.Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribunal: 
Challengesfor the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519 n.37 (1997) (quoting Chief 
Prosecutor Richard Goldstone). See also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32 
I.L.M. 1163, 1185 [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report) ("It is axiomatic that the International 
Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all 
stages of its proceedings."). 
15. This categorization does not include the accusation, made by some, that the ad hoc 
tribunals, particularly the ICTY, are inherently political and unfair. For an example ofthis point of view, 
see Michael Mandel, Milosevic Hasa Point,GLOBE &MAIL (Toronto), July 6, 2001, at A15. 
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the right to counsel. 6 The answer to this aspect of the fair trial question is 
complicated by the unique structures of these courts, which are cobbled 
together from the civil law and common law legal systems. 17 Furthermore, 
there are inherent difficulties in prosecuting these types of crimes, which, 
according to some,' 8 might call for extraordinary trial procedures, at least from 
the perspective ofdomestic legal norms.' 9 
A second approach to the problem of fair trials asks, instead, whether 
these international courts have the independence and coercive powers 
necessary to ensure fair trials, regardless of the sufficiency of the paper rights 
accorded the accused in the tribunals' statutes. For example, can these courts 
make certain that the accused is able to obtain the evidence and witnesses 
necessary for a serious defense?20 Or do the courts' judges have the 
independence necessary to withstand political pressure from the states on 
which they depend?21 In other words, despite the good intentions of the 
architects of these statutes, and the rights they formalistically contain, might 
these courts still lack certain essential capacities that criminal courts require in 
order to fulfill their functions satisfactorily? 
It is this second crucial, but often overlooked, aspect of the fair trial 
problem that I would like to take up here. A review of tribunal case law and 
past practice indicates that international criminal tribunals, as presently 
16. Some of these issues are noted briefly in Jos6 E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the 
TadicJudgment, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2031, 2061-68 (1998). Useful commentary on fair trial rights in the 
Rome Statute appears in William A. Schabas, Article 67: Rights of the Accused, in COMMENTARY ON 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INrEINATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 845 (Otto Triffierer ed., 1999). 
17. See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? ConstitutionalCriminalProcedurein 
an InternationalContext, 75 IMD. L.J. 809, 848-50 (2000); PanelDiscussion:Association ofAmerican 
Law Schools Panelon the InternationalCriminalCourt, 36 AM. CRiL. L. REV. 223, 251-56 (1999) 
(comments of Christopher L. Blakesley). 
18. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-InternationalCriminalLav, 114 HARv. L. REV. 
1943, 1985-93 (2001). 
19. There have been scattered articles dealing with particular substantive aspects of the fair 
trial right in the context of international criminal law. On confrontation, see Natasha A. Affolder, Tadic, 
the Anonymous Witness andthe Sources of InternationalProceduralLav, 19 MCH. J. INT'L L. 445 
(1998); Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comment, DueProcessand WitnessAnonymity, 91 AM. I. INr'L 
L. 75 (1997); Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses 
AgainstAccused, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 235 (1996); Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, Witness Anonymity 
is Inconsistentwith Due Process,91 AM. J. INT'L L. 80 (1997); and Sara Stapleton, Note, Ensuringa 
Fair Trial in the InternationalCriminalCourt: StatutoryInterpretationand the Impermissibility of 
Derogation,31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 535 (1999). On the right to counsel, see Kenneth S. Gallant, 
The Role andPowersof Defense Counsel in the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt,34 
INT'L LAW. 21 (2000). On proceedings in absentia, see Daniel J. Brown, The InternationalCriminal 
Court and Trials in Absentia, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 763 (1999); and Mark Thieroff & Edward A. 
Amley, Jr., Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans: The InternationalCriminal 
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 231 (1998). On the privilege 
against self-incrimination, see Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The PrivilegeAgainst 
Self-Incrimination in an InternationalContext, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1201 (1998). On the admission of 
evidence, including hearsay, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see Richard May & 
Marieke Wierda, Trends in InternationalCriminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and 
Arusha, 37 COLuM. I. TRANSNAT'L L. 725 (1999). On search and seizure, see George E. Edwards, 
InternationalHumanRightsLaw Challengesto the New InternationalCriminalCourt: The Search and 
Seizure Right to Privacy,26 YALE . INT'L L. 323 (2001). On fairness and speedy trials, see Patrick L. 
Robinson, EnsuringFairandExpeditious Trials at the InternationalCriminalTribunalforthe Former 
Yugoslavia, 11 EUn. J. INT'L L. 569 (2000). For case studies of the fair trial right in national legal 
systems, see THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (David Weissbrodt & Radiger Wolfrum eds., 1997). 
20. See infraPartIV. 
21. See infraPartV. 
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constituted, are limited in their ability to provide defendants with fair trials. 
Indeed, even if the statutory rights accorded the accused and the positive 
pronouncements made by these courts are consonant with fair trial 
standards, 22 shortcomings persist because the courts lack the requisite power, 
or its functional equivalent, to make those substantive rights real. In short, the 
disjunction between authority and control, common to international 
institutions, is too great to allow for consistently fair criminal adjudication. 
Whether the structural limitations on the tribunals are fatal, or whether their 
detrimental effects can be abated, remains to be seen. 
Part II of this Article identifies the basic fair trial rights at risk. Part III 
begins to explain why this may be so by describing how international criminal 
tribunals obtain the essentials of their existence through state cooperation. 
Parts IV and V explore how this cooperation regime has affected the ability of 
the ICTY and the ICTR to provide defendants with fair trials. Part VI 
evaluates whether the ICC is an improvement and outlines a number of 
possible ways to counter the fair-trial-limiting tendencies that plague 
international tribunals. 
II. FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS 
In order to know whether we should worry at all about fair trials in 
international criminal courts, we must first determine the standard by which 
these trials should be judged.23 This is not as straightforward as one might 
think. Part of the difficulty results from the suigeneris nature of these courts. 
They are not national courts, to which international conventions would more 
clearly apply. Nor do they replicate the rights or rules of any single legal 
system. The difficulties are compounded for the ad hoc tribunals. Their 
statutes contain no choice of law provisions, similar to article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice or to those that appear in some national 
constitutions, such as South Africa's, 24 which detail the sources of law for 
judges to look to when interpreting fair trial rights. These difficulties give rise 
to tricky interpretive questions for lawyers, judges, and commentators. 5 
Though panels of the ad hoc tribunals applied divergent approaches to 
the interpretation of fair trial rights early on,2 they have recently opted for a 
22. Cf Decision as to Admisibility, Naletilic v. Croatia, Application no. 51891/99, European 
Court of Human Rights, May 4, 2000, l(b) ("Involved here is the surrender to an international court 
which, in view of the content of its Statute and Rules of Procedure, offers all the necessary guarantees 
including those of impartiality and independence."). 
23. For a general discussion, see CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL 
CRnMNAL PROCEDURE 25-27, 42-44 (2001). 
24. S. AFR. CONST. sec. 39. 
25. See Claire Harris, Precedentin the Practiceof the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE 
AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 341 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE]. 
26. Compare Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for 
Victims and Witnesses, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Aug. 10, 1995, 18-30, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895pm.htm (adopting the "object and purpose" 
approach ofarticle 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties in an interpretation of article 21 
of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The Trial Chamber 
categorically distinguished case law that interpreted parallel fair trial provisions in two international 
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technique that takes the practice of national courts and regional human rights 
tribunals as a baseline. This approach was endorsed in a decision of the 
Delalic trial chamber,27 and elaborated in the Kupreskic trial chamber 
judgment.2 8 And though the ICTY refuses to adopt a strict test, chambers, 
including the Appeals Chamber, have consistently looked to the practice of 
national and regional courts when interpreting international fair trial rights. 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is an 
improvement in this regard, as it designates the "applicable law" to be utilized 
there.29 First,judges are to look to the Statute, the Elements of Crimes, and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; then, "where appropriate, [to the] 
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including 
the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;" and 
finally, "[flailing [all] that, [to the] general principles of law derived by the 
Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as 
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent 
with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized 
norms and standards." 30 Judges "may also apply principles and rules of law as 
interpreted in [the Court's] previous decisions."3' 
Thus, the Rome Statute's provisions and the practice of the international 
tribunals require these courts to aspire to the highest standards set by 
international human rights treaties, customary international law, and general 
principles of law.32 Policy considerations bolster this conclusion, as it would 
human rights conventions, article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights), with Separate Opinion ofJudge Stephen on the 
Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, The Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Aug. 10, 1995, available at http:/lwww.un.orglictyltadicltrialc2/decision-e50810pmn.htm ("[T]he 
general principle enunciated by the [European Court ofHuman Rights] ...[provides] clear guidance as 
to what are internationally recognised standards regarding the rights of the accused."). 
27. Decision on the Motions by the Prosecution for Protective Measures for the Prosecution 
Witnesses Pseudonymed 'B" Through to "M,"The Prosecution v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial 
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Apr. 28, 1997, 27, availableat 
http:llwww.un.orgictylcelebiciltrialc2/decision-e/70428PM2.htm ("[D]ecisions on the provisions of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights... and the European Convention on Human Rights 
...have been found to be authoritative and applicable."). 
28. Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. lT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 14, 2000, 537-542, available at 
http:llwww.un.orglictylkupreskic/trialc2/judgementl'mdex.htm, appealdismissedinpartandallowedin 
parton othergrounds,Appeal Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeals 
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 23, 2001, available at 
http://www.un.orgicty/kupreskic/appeal/judgement/kup-ajOl 1023e.pdf. 
29. Rome Statute, supranote 9, art 21. 
30. I art. 21(1). It is unclear whether domestic case law can be considered under the Article 
21(1)(c) rubric "general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of 
the world." 
31. Id. art. 21(2). Article 21 also provides that "[tihe application and interpretation of law 
pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without 
any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender, as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, 
race, colour, language, religion or belief political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
wealth, birth or other status." Id art. 21(3). 
32. Accord Decision on Preliminary Motions, The Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-
37-PT, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 8, 2001, 38, 
availableat http'J/www.un.orgicty/milosevicldecision-e/01 1108e.htm. 
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be inconceivable that an international tribunal (especially one trying such 
serious crimes) would be held less stringently to human rights norms than 
national legal systems. 
This is of some importance for the determination of what constitutes a 
fair trial in the situations described herein, because the courts' statutes, not 
surprisingly, contain lacunae and provisions that are susceptible to differing 
interpretations and applications. Thus, while the statutes of all three courts 
require "fair trials," and specify certain rights of the accused as well,33 it is not 
always evident from the texts what a fair trial entails or how those rights 
should be applied. The Rome Statute, for instance, guarantees to the accused 
the right "to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the 
defence" and "to obtain the attendance and examination or witnesses on his or 
her behalf., 34 No mention is made, specifically, of the right to procure 
evidence, though the word "facilities" has been interpreted by one 
commentator to mean "documents, records, etc. necessary for preparation of 
the defence," 35 and the Statute does make provision for the accused to request 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue orders and other measures to ensure 
cooperation "necessary to assist the person in the preparation of his or her 
defence., 36 No mention is made, either, of the principle of "equality of arms," 
though this, too, is assumed to be incorporated into the Rome Statute's 
guarantee of a fair trial,37 in part because the ICTY has recognized it in its 
own decisions. Thus, the Appeals Chamber explained in the Aleksovski case, 
citing a European Court of Human Rights decision, that "each party must be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case-including his 
evidence-under conditions that do not place him at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent., 38 We know, as well, from the tribunals' 
statutes and case law, that judicial independence is a crucial component of a 
fair trial before international criminal courts.39 
33. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia Since 1991, Art. 21, annexedto Secretary-General's Report, supranote 14, 32 I.L.M. 1159 
(1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, 
annex, Art. 20, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 67. 
34. Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 67(1)(b), (e). These provisions mirror those in the ICTY 
and ICTR Statutes. 
35. Schabas, supranote 16, at 855 (quoting MANFRED NowAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIoHTS: ICCPR COMMENTARY 256 (1993)). 
36. Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 57(3)(b). 
37. See Schabas, supranote 16, at 852. 
38. Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, The Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. 1-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Feb. 16, 1999, 24, available at http:l/www.un.orglictylaleksovskilappealldecision-e 
90216EV36313.htm (citing Dombo BeheerB.V v. The Netherlands, 18 E.H.R.R. 213, 230 (1993)); see 
also Foucher v. France, 25 E.H.R.R. 234, 247 (1997) ("[A]ccording to the principle of equality ofarms, 
as one of the features of the wider concept of a fair trial, each party must be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present his case in conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-i-vis his 
opponent"); Bulut v. Austria, 24 E.H.R.R. 84, 103-04 (1996) (same). 
39. See Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. 1T-95-17/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 21, 2000, 177-191, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/appeal/judgement/fur-aj000721 e.pdf. 
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In model domestic judicial systems, these three procedural/structural 
rights-the right to prepare a defense, equality of arms, and judicial 
independence-are all more or less taken for granted. As will become evident, 
in international criminal courts at present, such an assumption would be 
unwarranted. 
II. THE COOPERATION REGIME 
Why these fair trial rights may be at risk can be appreciated by 
recognizing one fact: international criminal courts are dependent on other 
organizations-states, most importantly-to give them things. These things-
money, evidence, access to evidence, defendants, witnesses, witness 
protection, court personnel, prison facilities, and the enforcement of orders 
and judgments-are all necessary for the courts' success, and, indeed, without 
them, the courts could not operate or exist.
40 
Though by now the two ad hoc tribunals to varying degrees have all of 
the staples and thus have the look and feel of courts, international justice 
requires more than just the basics.41 It is not enough that the ICTY and the 
ICTR, for example, have modem courtrooms, first-class prosecutors, and 
websites with all the works. They must also be able to get the necessities of 
criminal justice (evidence, witnesses, etc.) when and where they need them, 
and they must do so in ways that do not compromise their integrity. The same 
will be true of the future ICC.
42 
40. See, e.g., KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, 
COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION (2000); STEVEN R.RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCrrIEs ININTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG 
LEGACY 216-26 (1997); Irene Gartner, The Rules of Procedure andEvidence on Co-operation and 
Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 423 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL AND 
NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES]; Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of 
Enforcement in InternationalCriminalLaw, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321 (1999); Gdran Sluiter, Co-
operation with the InternationalCriminal Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES, supra, at 681; Bert Swart & Gtran Sluiter, 
The InternationalCriminal Court and InternationalCriminal Cooperation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE 
ICC, supra note 3, at 91. See generally DAVID McCLEAN, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 
(1992); M.CherifBassiouni PolicyConsiderationson Inter-stateCooperationin CriminalMatters,in 2 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
41. This is not to say that the ICTY and the ICTR are on the same footing; they are not. 
Individuals, NGOs, and states have taken a greater interest in the ICTY, for a variety of reasons. This 
has led, most obviously, to a marked difference in the quality of the personnel and resources available to 
the two ad hoc tribunals. See Steven Edwards, Rwanda Tribunal Coming Undone: "Concernfor 
Fairness":Night-and-Day Contrastwith Balkan War-CrimesInquiry, NAT'L POST (Toronto), Mar. 5, 
2001, at Al. 
42. For discussions and critiques ofthe cooperation regime instituted in the Rome Statute, see 
Jacob Katz Cogan, The Problemof ObtainingEvidenceforInternationalCriminalcourts,22 HUM. RTS. Q. 404, 424-26 (2000); Hans-Peter Kaul & Claus KreB, JurisdictionandCooperationin the Statute of 
the InternationalCriminalCourt: Principlesand Compromises,2 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 143, 
157-70 (1999); Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The InternationalCriminalCourt: An Uneasy 
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 444-47 (2000); and Swart & Sluiter, supra note 40, at 681. For the 
negotiating history and a review ofthe relevant provisions of the Rome Statute, see Claus Kre3 et al., 
Part9: InternationalCooperationandJudicialAssistance, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, 
supra note 16, at 1045-68; and THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: TI-IEMAKINo OF THE ROME 
STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 270-94, 305-17 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
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This is a difficult proposition given the position of these courts within 
the structure of the international system. The tribunals must rely on the 
kindness of strangers--"international cooperation" and "judicial assistance" 
are the terms of art-for all their needs. "We depend on the goodwill of the 
parties," noted Christian Chartier, then-ICTY spokesperson. 43 When an 
international court's jurisdiction is consensual, as in the case of the 
International Court of Justice and similar tribunals, cooperation and judicial 
assistance problems are significantly reduced, though not eliminated. 
44 
International criminal tribunals, in contrast, deal, by definition, with non-
consensual parties (be they the person under indictment, the accused's country 
of origin, or third-parties that have information relevant to the case),45 and, in 
spite of various statutory obligations,46 those parties are likely to be less 
inclined
47to cooperate willingly or fully, for the best or for the worst of 
reasons. 
It is not just the recalcitrance of interested states that hampers 
international criminal courts; the very statutes and rules that created these 
courts also restrict their operation. Take, for example, the ICTY Statute. 
Article 29 provides that "States shall co-operate with the International 
Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of 
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law., 48 This 
article is binding on states, the ICTY being a creation of the Security Council 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. But the ICTY's rules curtail the 
Article 29 obligation by creating loopholes for national security information 
(Rule 54bis) and materials provided to the court on a confidential basis (Rule 
70). 49 Thus, states can restrict and tailor their cooperation while upholding 
their Charter obligations. The same "give-with-one-hand-and-take-with-the-
other" structure pervades the Rome Statute and its Rules.50 Indeed, it was only 
43. Quoted in Mark Rice-Oxley, Tribunal Depends on the Kindness ofFoes,NAT'L L.J., June 
3, 1996, at A10. 
44. Cf. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Apr. 9) ("[Certain documents] 
were not produced, the Agent pleading naval secrecy; and the United Kingdom witnesses declined to 
answer certain questions relating to them. It is not therefore possible to know the real content of these 
naval orders."). 
45. This is true even if, in the case of the International Criminal Court, the state is a state party 
to the Rome Statute. On defiance ofthe ICTY, see Richard J. Goldstone & Gary Jonathan Bass, Lessons 
from the InternationalCriminalTribunals,in THE UNrrED STATES AND THE ICC, supranote 8, at 51, 56-
57. 
46. See infranotes 48-50. 
47. For an example of domestic legal impediments to cooperation, see In re Ntakirutimana, 
No. CIV. A. L-98-43, 1998 WL 655708 (S.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Ntakirutimanav. Reno, 184 
F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000); and In re Ntakirutimana,988 F. Supp. 
1038 (S.D. Tex. 1997). See also Goran Sluiter, To Cooperateor Not to Cooperate? The Case of the 
FailedTransfer of Ntakirutimanato the Rwanda Tribunal, 11 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 383 (1998). For a 
discussion of implementing legislation and international cooperation, see Bruce Broomhall, The 
InternationalCriminal Court: Overview, and Cooperationwith States, in ICC RATIFICATION AND 
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 44 (1999); and Goran Sluiter, Obtaining Evidence for the 
InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia: An Overview andAssessment ofDomestic 
ImplementingLegislation,45 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 87 (1998). 
48. ICTY Statute, supranote 33, art. 29; accordICTR Statute, supranote 33, art. 28. 
49. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Rules 54bis, 70, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.21 (2001); accordInternational Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 56, 70, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.10 (2001). 
50. See Rome Statute, supranote 9, pt. 9; Finalized Draft Text ofthe Rules ofProcedure and 
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with these enfeebling concessions that states were willing to accede to the 
"binding obligation" to cooperate with the ad hoc tribunals and the future 
ICC. It is the Catch-22 that is at the heart of international criminal justice. 
For the post-World War II criminal tribunals, cooperation was less of an 
issue because the Allies' victory and political will secured access to the 
relevant evidence and witnesses. 1 Contemporary tribunals differ in this 
critical respect.52 The importance of international cooperation for the 
continued existence of international criminal courts is evident in the debate 
over U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute. Advocates of the ICC know that it 
is crucial that the United States, with its diplomatic, intelligence, and military 
resources, be willing to assist the Court, even if it refuses to ratify the Statute. 
Anti-Court activists, for the same reason, have pushed legislation that would 
prohibit the United States from giving such assistance.53 Without cooperation, 
particularly U.S. cooperation, international criminal courts, in the words of 
Judge Antonio Cassese, "turn out to be utterly impotent."54 
Commentators are well aware of the difficulties the cooperation regime 
creates for effective prosecutions; less appreciated is how the same problems 
affect the rights of the accused. Discussed below are two types of examples 
drawn from the experiences of the ad hoc tribunals that involve the fair trial 
rights noted above: restrictions on the ability of the accused to mount a 
defense, and political influence of states on the work of these courts. 
IV. DIFFICULTIES: LIMITATIONS ON THE DEFENSE 
In several ways, the cooperation regime limits the ability of the accused 
to gain access to the materials that might be necessary to put on a reasonable 
defense. These limitations, which do not weigh equally on the prosecution, 
Evidence, ch. 11, U.N. Doc. PCNICCI2000IIAdd.1 (2000). 
51. See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 204 (2000); ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THEUNTOLD STORY 
OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRiALs 57-58, 60 (1987); JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN 
THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 450 (1999); MINOW, supra note 6, at 48; PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE 
JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLID WAR CRMES OPERATIOiNS rN THE EAST, 1945-195 1, at 41, 45 (1979); M. 
CherifBassiouni, The Sourcesand ContentofInternationalCriminalLaw: A TheoreticalFramework,in 
1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL LAW 3, 6-7 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999); cf.Kenneth Anderson, 
NurembergSensibility: Telford Taylor'sMemoir of the Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 
293 (1994) (book review) ("[Tlhose who want to imitate Nuremberg in Yugoslavia have deeply 
mistaken what the Nuremberg trial was all about."). 
52. Accord James Blount Griffin, Note, A Predictive Frameworkfor the Effectiveness of 
InternationalCriminalTribunals,34 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 405 (2001). 
53. See An Act Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, 
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, 
§ 630 (2001); American Servicemembers' Protection Act of2001, H.R. 1794/S. 857, 107th Cong. §§ 4-
7 (2001). But cf.American Citizens' Protection and War Criminal Prosecution Act of 2001, S.1296, 
107th Cong. § 7 (2001) ("Notwithstanding any other law, while the United States is not a party to the 
Rome Statute, the United States may provide support and assistance, as appropriate, on a case-by-case 
basis to the International Criminal Court for the prosecution of accused war criminals, particularly those 
accused of crimes against United States servicemembers, United States citizens, or citizens of countries 
friendly to, or allied with, the United States when the President determines that doing so would serve 
important United States interests."). 
54. Antonio Cassese, Reflections on InternationalCriminalJustice, 61 MOD. L. REv. 1, 10 
(1998). 
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skew international criminal trials against the defendant in ways that can 
infringe upon the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. 
A. Evidence Gathering:Blaskic 
Take evidence gathering and the case of Tihomir Blaskic. 55 Blaskic is a 
Bosnian Croat who was a colonel and then a general in the Croatian Defense 
Council (HVO), the Bosnian Croat army, during the Bosnian war. In the 
spring of 1993, Croat forces in central Bosnia attempted to rid the area of non-
Croats, and in what came to be called ethnic cleansing, massacred hundreds of 
Muslim civilians in the Lasva Valley-most infamously in the village of 
Ahmici. Blaskic was the commander of the HVO's Central Bosnia Operative 
Zone at the time. Subsequently, in 1995, he was indicted by the ICTY, under 
the theory of command responsibility, of crimes against humanity, grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and war crimes. Blaskic 
surrendered himself to the Tribunal in 1996, and, after a long trial, he was 
convicted and sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment on March 3, 2000.56 
Days later, Croatian authorities announced that they had found documents that 
would exonerate him.
57 
That these new, perhaps exculpating, documents appeared when they 
did, or that they appeared at all, was simply fortuitous-the lucky result of 
one man's demise. Under the presidency of Franjo Tudjman, Croatia had 
spumed repeated requests for cooperation from the ICTY. Indeed, the ICTY's 
most important judicial decision on state cooperation resulted from Tudjman's 
refusal to accede to a subpoena during the Blaskic trial itself, which might 
have revealed these documents. 58 That changed with Tudjman's death in 
December 1999 and the election of a new coalition government, headed by the 
Social Democratic Party and the Croatian Social Liberal Party, early in 
2000.59 That spring, just as the Blaskic verdict was handed down, Croatian 
authorities began searching the archives of the Croatian Information Service 
55. My preliminary thoughts on this issue, up through the trial and sentencing of Tihomir 
Blaskic, appear in Cogan, supra note 42, at 404. The discussion here extends the story into the appeals 
stage of the Blaskic case. 
56. See Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 3, 2000, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialcl/judgement/bla-tj000303e.pdf. 
57. Ivica Racan, the Croatian prime minister, said: "A few days ago we came upon extensive 
documents related to the war in Bosnia which shed new light on the events raised at Blaskic's trial 
before the tribunal in The Hague." ICTY Expects Croatiato Cooperate, GLOBAL NEWS WiRE, Mar. 8, 
2000, availableatLEXIS, News Library, GNW File. 
58. See The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 29, 1997, available at 
http://www.un.orglicty/blaskic/appealldecision-e/71029JT3.html [hereinafter Blaskic Subpoena 
Decision]. For a discussion, see Cogan, supra note 42, at 415-23; Peter Malanczuk, A Note on the 
Judgement of the Appeals Chamberof the InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia 
on the Issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum in the Blaskic Case, I Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 229 
(1998); and Yves Nouvel, Pricisionssur le pourvoirdu Tribunalpour l'ex-Yugoslavie d'ordonnerla 
productiondes preuves et la comparutiondes tdmoins L "Arritde la Chambred'appel du 29 octobre 
1997dans l'affaireBlaskic, 102 REVUE G NRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 157 (1998). 
59. See Croatia Vows to Cooperate with Tribunal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at A14; 
CroatianParliamentBacks Cooperation with UN War CrimesTribunal,AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 
15, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2774533; see also Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can 
International Criminal Justice Prevent FutureAtrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 19-22 (2001). 
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and Tudjman's presidential palace. There they found an archive of war that 
stretched back years and years. "We have [until now] tried unsuccessfully to 
gain access to government archives," Anto Nobilo, one of Blaskic's attorneys, 
noted at the time.60 Croatia soon handed over many, bit by no means all, of 
the documents to the Tribunal, including transcripts of taped conversations 
Tudjman had with his top generals about the events in the Lasva Valley.61 
According to Blaskic's defenders, the documents show that he was 
framed by Tudjman and other Croatian political elites for the crimes 
committed in Ahmici so as to divert suspicion from the real culprits-the 
Croatian political operatives who gave the orders, the Bosnian Croat political 
leadership who supervised the killings and other crimes, and the Bosnian 
Croat "military police" who committed the atrocities.62 In other words, if all 
of this is true, then Blaskic neither gave the orders to commit the massacre nor 
failed to give orders to prevent the slaughter that took place in Ahmici, and 
thus should not be held responsible for those events, as he was at trial.63 
Blaskic's appeal is pending,64 and it may be that the Appeals Chamber 
reviewing the Trial Chamber judgment in light of the new evidence will 
exonerate Blaskic, reduce his sentence, or order that he be re-tried.65 
Even if his appeal fails, Blaskic's case demonstrates the inherent 
constraints on the accused in putting on a defense before international 
60. Eugene Brcic, New War Crime Case Evidence Found, AP ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2000, 
availableat2000 WL 15786528. 
61. See Constitution Watch: Croatia,E. EUR. CON. REV., Summer 2000, at 10, 10-12. In 
January 2001, the Croatian government announced its intention to seal the unreleased tapes and 
transcripts of Tudjman's conversations with his aides for thirty years. Carla Del Ponte, the Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICTY, had sought uninhibited access to the tapes because they might reveal evidence 
relevant to ongoing and future investigations, including, potentially, investigations that would implicate 
top Croatian officials, some now considered war heroes, and others still active in politics and in the 
military, of committing or covering-up war crimes. The Croatian government did say that it would allow 
access to the tapes on a case-by-case basis. See UN Court Requests Controversial Tapes, AP 
WORLDSTREAK Jan. 8, 2001; Eugene Breic, Croatiato Seal Tudman Tapes, AP ONLNE, Jan. 11, 2001, 
availableat 2001 WL 3651585; see also Croatia'sPM Admits Problems in Cooperation with ICTY, 
AGENCEFRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 11, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 24779139. 
62. See Chris Stephen, British Officers "Clear" Bosnian War Criminal, SCOTLAND ON 
SUNDAY (Edinburgh), Apr. 9, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 4011654; DelPonte in CroatiaamidFresh 
Claims over War Crimes Suspects, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, May 24, 2000, available at 2000 WL 
2800630; Paul Lashmar, Cabell Bruce & John Cookson, The Tudjman Tapes: Secret RecordingsLink 
DeadDictatorto BosniaCrimes,INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 1, 2000, at 16. 
63. One of the politicians who apparently was in the direct chain of command was Dario 
Kordic, vice-president of the Bosnian Croat state during the war. Kordic was convicted recently in The 
Hague as a co-perpetrator, rather than under the theory of command responsibility. See Judgement, The 
Prosecutor v. Kordic , Case No. IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 26, 2001, 829, 834, 840-41, available at http://www.un.orgicty/kordie 
triale/judgement/kor-tj010226e.pdf; see also Marlise Simons, UN Tribunal Convicts Bosnian Croat 
Leader; Tudman Ally is Handed 25-Year Sentence, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2001, at 5. Croatia has 
arrested and has issued arrest warrants for the persons who are now suspected of committing the Ahmici 
massacre. See Snjezana Vukic, CroatiaArrests War Crime Suspects, AP ONLINE, Sept. 12, 2000, 
availableat2000 WI. 26674877. 
64. Because the new documents must be translated, and because there are so many of them, 
the Appeals Chamber has suspended the usual briefing schedule. No argument date has yet been set. See 
Decision on the Appellant's Motions for the Production of Material, Suspension or Extension of the 
Briefing Schedule, and Additional Findings, The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals 
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Sept. 26, 2000, available at 
http:llwww.un.orglictyblaskiclappealldecision-etOO926PN313780.htm. 
65. See Kupreskic,supranote 28, pt. X. 
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criminal courts. Evidence necessary to prove innocence or to assert a legal 
defense may be beyond the reach of the court, either because of the court's 
inability to successfully coerce the evidence-holder or because the evidence-
holder deliberately seeks to influence the outcome of the trial by manipulating 
the release ofprobative information.66 
B. Evidence Gathering:Todorovic 
The Todorovic case provides another example of the difficulties of 
cooperation in the area of evidence gathering. Stevan Todorovic is a Bosnian 
Serb from Donja Slatina in the municipality of Bosanski Samac in northern 
Bosnia.67 According to Tribunal prosecutors, Todorovic was appointed the 
Chief of Police for Bosanski Samac after Serb forces occupied that area in 
April 1992.68 A 1995 ICTY indictment alleged that, in this capacity, 
Todorovic, together with four others charged in the same indictment,
"committed, planned, instigated, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted a 
campaign of persecutions and 'ethnic cleansing' and committed other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law directed against Bosnian Croat, 
Bosnian Muslim and other non-Serb civilians residing in the Bosanski Samac 
and Odzak municipalities in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina." 69 In 
particular, Todorovic was charged with twenty-seven counts of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, for acts, by his own hand or by virtue of his superior authority, of 
persecution (including detention and forced deportation), murder, beating, 
torture, and sexual assault, which allegedly took place from April 1992 
through December 1993.70 Todorovic was arrested by the multinational 
"stabilization force" in Bosnia (SFOR) at the Tuzla Air Force Base on 
September 27, 1998, and transferred to The Hague for trial. 
Ever since, Todorovic has claimed that he had been kidnapped from his 
home in Serbia by bounty hunters hired by SFOR (perhaps even in accord 
with the ICTY's Office of the Prosecutor)71 and then taken across the border 
into Bosnia where SFOR arrested him.72 This, he said, was an illegal form of 
66. AccordAlfred P. Rubin, The International Criminal Court:Possibilitiesfor Prosecutorial 
Abuse, 64 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 153, 161 (2001). 
67. See Second Amended Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17, available at http:lwww.un.orgictyl 
indictment/english/sim-2ai98121 le.htm. 
68. Id 
69. Id 13. 
70. Id. 29-47. 
71. Todorovic's testimony in regards to his kidnaping was given on November 24, 1999, and 
a transcript thereof is available. See http:l/www.un.orglicty/transe9/991124MH.htm. In December 2000, 
a Serbian court convicted nine Serbs of abducting Todorovic in exchange for $22,700. See Katarina 
Kratovac, Nine Serbs Convicted of Kidnapping,AP ONLINE, Dec. 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL 
30321027. The nine men's sentences ranged from six months to eight-and-a-half years. See Nine Who 
Handed Over Bosnian Warcrimes Suspect Sent to Jail, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 11, 2000, 
availableat 2000 WL 24779222. 
72. Dragan Nikolic, another ICTY defendant, has made a similar claim, which is being 
litigated presently. See Mirko Klarin, The Tribunal's "IllegalDetention," IWPR TRIBUNAL UPDATE 
222, May 21-26, 2001, availableat http://www.iwpr.netindex.pl?archive/tri/tri 222_1_eng.txt; Misha 
Savic, Lawyer Disputes Bosnian Serb Arrest, AP ONLINE, May 6, 2006, available at 2000 WL 
19888475; Jerome Socolovsky, War Crime Suspects Claiming Illegal Abductions: Eichmann Case 
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apprehension under international law, and on October 21, 1999, he filed a 
"Motion for an order directing the Prosecutor to forthwith return [him] to the 
country of refuge." 73 On November 24, 1999, Todorovic filed a "notice of 
Motion for Judicial Assistance," which sought information, including 
documents and testimony, from SFOR and other military forces operating in 
Bosnia, which he hoped to use as evidence in support of his October 21 
motion.74 Also for the same purpose, Todorovic, on December 6, 1999, 
submitted a motion to compel the Prosecutor to produce certain relevant 
documents. Three months later, on March 7, 2000, the Trial Chamber, hoping 
to avoid ruling on Todorovic's politically delicate request for assistance from 
SFOR, granted the much less controversial December 6 motion, and the 
Tribunal's Appeals Chamber affirmed this ruling.75 The Office of the 
Prosecutor, however, lacked nearly all of the documents requested; 
additionally, SFOR refused to hand over any information voluntarily. Briefs 
were then submitted on Todorovic's still-pending request for documents from 
SFOR, and oral argument was held July 25, 2000.76 On October 18, 2000, the 
Trial Chamber granted Todorovic's motion for judicial assistance77 and 
Studied, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 5, 2000, at 23A-
73. Whether such a scheme does violate international law and whether the accused's return to 
his country of origin would be an appropriate remedy for such a violation are difficult issues and have 
not been decided by the ICTY or the ICTR. There are some decisions, such as the Eichmann and 
Alvarez-Machaincases, on point. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Attorney-
General v. Eichmann, 45 P.M. 3 (1965), 36 I.L.R. 5, 233 (D.C. Jm. 1961), aff'd 16 P.D. 2003, 36 I.L.R. 
277 (S.Ct. 1962) (Isr.). One ICTY Trial Chamber has decided that surreptitiously "luring" a person to a 
location where he was then arrested did not violate the statute. See Decision on the Motion for Release 
by the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic, The Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, Case No. IT-1995-13a-PT, Trial 
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 22, 1997, 88. The Appeals 
Chamber denied Dokmanovic leave to appeal this decision. 
74. These motions were made before, in March 1999, and were rejected, without prejudice, by 
the Trial Chamber because Todorovic had failed to offer prima facie evidence of his abduction. See 
Decision Stating Reasons for Trial Chamber's Order of 4 March 1999 on Defence Motion for 
Evidentiary Hearing on the Arrest ofthe Accused Todorovic, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-
9, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 25, 1999, available 
at http'/www.un.orgictylsimic/trialc3/decision-e/90325MS56368.htm see also Transcript of 
Proceedings, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 4, 1999, available at http://www.un.orgicty/ 
transe9/990304MHhtm. Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber's 
interpretation ofthe burden of proof on this issue. See Decision on Appeal by Stevan Todorovic Against 
the Oral Decision of 4 March 1999 and the Written Decision of 25 March 1999 of Trial Chamber IK 
The Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. T-95-9, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 13, 1999, available at http:llwww.un.orgicty/simiclappealldecision-el 
910137239576.htm. 
75. See Order on Defence Requests for Judicial Assistance for the Production of Information, 
The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 7, 2000, available at http:llwww.un.orglicty/simieltrialc3/order-
e/00307PN511789.htm; Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal Against Trial Chamber Decision 
of 7 March 2000, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 3, 2000, available at http:I/www.un.orglicty/simiclappeall 
decision-el00503DE312854.htm. 
76. For a transcript of this argument, see Transcript ofthe Argument,The Prosecutor v. Simic, 
July 25, 2000, at 746, availableathttp:llwww.un.orgicty/transe9/000725MH.htm. 
77. See Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others, The 
Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Oct. 18, 2000, available at http:llwww.un.orglicty/simicltrialc3/decision-el 
01018EV513778.htm. The Trial Chamber's decision was based on an application of the Blaskic 
SubpoenaDecision,supranote 58, and analogous decisions of other ICTY trial chambers. See Decision 
on Defence Motion to Issue Subpoena to United Nations Secretariat, The Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, Case 
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ordered SFOR, the North Atlantic Council, and the states participating in 
SFOR to provide documents related to Todorovic's apprehension. The Trial 
Chamber also issued a subpoena to U.S. General Eric Shinseki, who was the 
commanding general of the Tuzla base when Todorovic was apprehended, 
requiring him to testify about Todorovic's arrest.78 
The importance of the Trial Chamber's decision for its ability to conduct 
fair trials was spelled out in Judge Patrick Robinson's separate opinion: 
No legal system, whether international or domestic, that is based on the rule of law, can 
countenance the prospect of a person being deprived of his liberty, while its tribunals or 
courts remain powerless to require the detaining or arresting authority to produce, in 
proceedings challenging the legality of the arrest, material relevant to the detention or 
arrest; in such a situation, legitimate questions may be raised about the independence of 
those judicial bodies.79 
Judge Robinson's logic, however, failed to convince the ICTY's 
Prosecutor and the states subject to the Trial Chamber's orders. On October 
25, 2000, the Prosecutor filed an appeal, and on November 2, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, NATO, Norway, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States filed requests for review of the Trial 
Chamber's decision. A few days later, on November 6, France did the same. 
On November 8, the ICTY's Appeals Chamber stayed the Trial Chamber's 
orders and scheduled dates for written submissions and oral argument, the 
latter of which was eventually postponed until January 10, 2001.8" The United 
States, in its legal brief, asserted that the Tribunal did not have the ability to 
summon General Shinseki and that, in any case, "compelling operation 
security concerns" precluded disclosure.81 The brief also told the judges, not 
so subtly, that their decision "will be of utmost significance to the future of 
the tribunal, and its relationship with those engaged in the apprehension of 
persons indicted for war crimes.' 82 
Before the Appeals Chamber could hear the appeal, Todorovic, on 
December 13, 2000, formally entered into a plea bargain with tribunal 
prosecutors.83 According to the plea, prosecutors agreed to withdraw twenty-
No. IT-97-24, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 1, 1998, 
availableat http:l/www.un.orgictylkovacevic/trialc2/decision-e80701SP2.htm Decision on Ex Parte 
Application for the Issuance of an Order to the European Community Monitoring Mission, The 
Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, May 3, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/decision-e/ 
00503PN513632.htm; Decision Refusing Defence Motion for Subpoena, The Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, 
Case No. IT-97-24, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 23, 
1998, availableat http://www.un.org/icty/kovacevictrialc2/decision-e/80623SP2.htm. 
78. See Jerome Socolovsky, Tribunal Subpoenas NATO Gen., AP ONLINE, Oct. 20, 2000, 
availableat2000 WL 28614085. 
79. Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be 
Provided by SFOR and Others, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 18, 2000, 7, available at 
http:lwww.un.orglictylsimicltrialc3/decision-el0018EVT13779.htm. 
80. See Decision and Scheduling Order, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Appeals 
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 18, 2000, available at 
http:lwww.un.orglicty/simiclappealdecision-e1 108JA314063.htm. 
81. See Jerome Socolovsky, U.S.Opposes Tribunal's Subpoena, AP ONLINE, Dec. 6, 2000, 
availableat2000 WL 30319246. 
82. Id (quoting the U.S. brief). 
83. See Jerome Socolovsky, Bosnian Serb Suspect PleadsGuilty, AP ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2000, 
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six of the twenty-seven counts filed and Todorovic agreed to plead guilty to 
the remaining count-that of persecution, a crime against humanity-and to 
withdraw all of his outstanding motions, including those for judicial 
assistance.84 Prosecutors also agreed to recommend a sentence of no more 
than twelve-years imprisonment, instead of the life sentence allowable under 
the Tribunal's statute.85 Deputy Chief Prosecutor Graham Blewitt said, rather 
unconvincingly, that "[a]bsolutely nothing has been sacrificed. 86 But Blewitt 
acknowledged that there had been a recent decline in the number of arrests by 
SFOR and that "[he] would not be surprised if [the Todorovic case] had 
something to do with it.",87 Unlike in Blaskic, the detrimental consequences of 
a defendant's inability to secure evidence did not fully materialize in the 
Todoroviccase, but the lesson is just as valid. 
C. Evidence Gathering:Lockerbie 
Blaslic and Todorovicdemonstrate the impact of non-cooperation on the 
possibility ofconducting fair trials for international criminal courts. Though in 
a Scottish court in The Netherlands, not in an international court, strictly 
speaking, the recent Lockerbie trial presents a variation of the difficulties of 
evidence gathering: partial cooperation. In Lockerbie, a Libyan Central 
Intelligence Agency double agent named Abdul Majid Giaka was the Crown's8 
star witness. He promised to link the two accused to the bomb that blew up 
Pan Am 103. For ten years, the CIA refused to release classified cables 
regarding its relationship with Giaka. In June 2000, a month after the trial 
began, the CIA allowed the prosecution to see twenty-five of these cables, but 
the defense only received redacted copies. 89 In August, the defense learned of 
the discrepancy and demanded that it, too, receive the unedited versions.90 The 
availableat 2000 WL 30832710. The plea agreement was made at the end ofNovember and had been 
kept confidential. 
84. Id 
85. Id 
86. Id An ICTY Trial Chamber accepted the guilty plea at a hearing on January 19, 2001. See 
Press Release, Todorovic Case: Guilty Plea Accepted by Trial Chamber, XT/P.I.S./556-e, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 19, 2001, available at http://www.un.orgicty/ 
pressreal/p556-e.htm. On February 26, 2001, this same Trial Chamber accepted the prosecution's 
motion to withdraw the remaining counts against Todorovic and Todorovic's motion to withdraw all 
pending motions filed by the defense. See Sentencing Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case 
No. IT-95-9/1-S, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 31, 
2001, 8, available at http:llwww.un.orglicty/todorovicljudgementltod-tjO0731e.pdf On July 31, 
2001, he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Id 117. 
87. Todorovic Case: In a Sensational New Twist, Stevan Todorovic Pleads Guilty to 
Persecution Charges, IWPR TRMUNAL UPDATE, Dec. 11-16, 2000, available at 
http://www.iwpr.netindex.pl?archiveltri/tri2031_eng.txt (quoting Graham Blewitt). 
88. The facts recounted here are based on Herve Clere, CIA Accused of Withholding 
Informationfrom Lockerbie Trial, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 
24716350; DoubleAgent to FaceCourt,HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 22, 2000, at 12; Peter Ford, Doubts 
About Key Lockerbie Witness, CHRISTAN SCi. MoNIToR, Sept. 5, 2000, at 8; Gerard Seenan, Doubts 
over CrucialLockerbie Witness: CIA Cables Threaten ProsecutionCase that Relies on Evidence from 
Libyan DoubleAgent Who Worked with Accused, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 31, 2000, at 11. 
89. Apparently, the Crown wanted the cables so that it could refresh Giaka's recollection 
when he took the witness stand. 
90. The defense based its request on decisions from the European Court of Human Rights 
requiring that the defendant and the prosecution have "equality of arms." See supra notes 36-38 and 
accompanying text. 
128 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 27: 111prosecution said that the blacked-out portions of the cables were of no relevance and that, in any event, national security concerns prevented their full release. But the Scottish court granted the defense's request and, for the first time in its history, the CIA provided a foreign court with classified documents. The unexpurgated cables showed that Giaka's handlers had serious doubts about his veracity and that it was only after the CIA threatened to take him off the payroll that he revealed any information about the Lockerbie bombing. With this information in hand, defense counsel requested all other U.S. classified documents that pertained to Giaka, and the court adjourned for the first three weeks of September to allow the CIA to decide whether it would provide the additional materials. The CIA provided an additional 36 cables, some of which cast doubt on the prosecution's allegations. The defense then made an additional request for any CIA materials relevant to the bombing, but the court rejected this bid. William Taylor, counsel for one of the accused, noted that "[it] is alarming for the prospects of this trial being construed by third parties as a fair trial when external sources [namely, the CIA] have dissembled in relation to certain evidence."91 His co-counsel, Richard Keen, referring to the defense's theorythat the Pan Am 103 bombing was committed by Palestinian terrorists and not the two Libyans on trial, noted that "[t]he CIA had a very material part in the investigation of this disaster, it does have evidence and production of that evidence to date has ... been tailored [to implicate the two accused]."92 On January 31, 2001, the Scottish court found one of the two defendants guilty and the other not guilty.93 We will not know whether the CIA's partial cooperation with the Scottish tribunal had an impact on the verdicts. It is predictable, though, that by virtue of its mission, what the CIA knows will likely be of some importance to many international criminal trials, and consequently, that this issue will recur.94D. Witness ProtectionWhat is true of evidence gathering applies equally to the procurement of witness testimony. One of these similarities is the danger of state manipulation of witnesses. In January 2000, for example, Milan Vujin, one of Dusko Tactic's attorneys, was found in contempt of court for directing witness testimony so as not to reveal the culpability of Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav higher-ups.95 This lent credence to the belief that some were attempting to manipulate the proceedings in The Hague. 96 Another similarity is the potential unequal access to information. Tactic's inability to gain access to witnesses in 91. Double Agent to Face Court, supra note 88.92. Id93. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Verdict's Reasoning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at A9.94. See, e.g., Roy Gutman, What Did the CIA Know?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2001, at 30 ("Theinformation the United States possesses is relevant to establishing General Gotovina's innocence.") (quoting Luka Misetic, attorney for indicted Croatian General Ante Gotovina). 95. See Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 31, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/vujin-e/index.htm.96. See Jerome Socolovsky, Belgrade Lawyer Found in Contempt, AP ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 12386401. 
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the Republika Srpska, which refused to cooperate with the defense, compared 
with the Prosecutor's ability to bring in its witnesses, who were mainly 
persons now residing in Western Europe and North America, served as one of 
the grounds of the appeal of his conviction. According to counsel for Tadic, 
"the lack of cooperation displayed by the authorities in the Republika Srpska 
had a disproportionate impact on the Defence .... [And accordingly] there 
was no 'equality of arms' between the Prosecution and the Defence at trial.. 
[T]he effect of this lack of cooperation was serious enough to frustrate 
[Tadic's] right to a fair trial. 97 Though the Appeals Chamber recognized the 
problem, stating that "[it could] conceive of situations where a fair trial is not 
possible because witnesses central to the defence case do not appear due to the 
obstructionist efforts of a State,"98 it rejected Tadic's appeal.99 The same 
problems exist in Rwanda, where defense counsel have complained for some 
time about unequal access to and improper governmental tampering with 
witnesses. 100 
There are additional complications, still, when it comes to witnesses. 
Prosecutors and defense counsel not only need to gain access to witnesses, as 
in Tadic and Todorovic, they need also be able to provide witnesses-persons 
who often still live in territory marked by violence-with necessary 
protection, especially anonymity. For this, again, international criminal courts 
depend on states. What happens when a court gives such protection, but is 
unable to enforce it? 
In November 2000, for instance, two newspapers in Croatia published 
excerpts from testimony of a witness in the Blaskic case who had been given 
protective measures, thereby violating the ICTY's orders. On December 1,the 
Blaskic Trial Chamber issued an "Order for the Immediate Cessation of 
Violations of Protective Measures for Witnesses," which required that "the 
publication of statements or testimonies of the witness concerned, and 
generally, of any protected witness, shall cease immediately."'' Failure to do 
so, the Court pronounced, "shall expose [the publication's] author(s) and those 
responsible to be found in contempt of the Tribunal.' 0,12 Without a police 
force of its own,10 3 or any authority to conduct investigations in Croatia, the 
97. See The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Appeals Chamber, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 15, 1999, 29, availableat http:llwww.un.orgietyl 
tadic/appealljudgement/ [hereinafter Tadic Appeal]; see also Opening Statement of Michail 
Wladimiroff Counsel for Dusko Tadic, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 7, 1996, at 54-59, 63-65, availableat 
http:llwww.un.org/ictyltransel/9605071T.htm; MIcHAEL P. ScHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY 
BEHIND THE FIRST bTENATONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SiNcE NtJREMBERG 176 (1997); War Crimes 
Tribunals: The Record andthe Prospects: The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 
1441 (1998) (comments ofMichall Wladimiroff). 
98. TadicAppeal, supranote 97, 55-56. 
99. Id 56. 
100. See Isabel Vincent, CanadianLawyers Say Hands Tied in Arusha, NAT'L POST, July 28, 
2001, at B1. 
101. See Order for the Immediate Cessation of Violations of Protective Measures for 
Witnesses, The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 1, 2000, available at http:llwww.un.orglictylblaskic/trialell 
order-e/01201PM014337.htm [hereinafter BasldcOrder]. 
102. Id 
103. See Major Christopher M. Supernor, InternationalBounty Hunters for War Criminals: 
Privatizingthe EnforcementofJustice,50 A.F. L. REv. 215, 215 (2001). 
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Court requested that the authorities in Croatia "take immediately all measures 
necessary to bring the publication of the Statements to an end and to provide 
the Chamber with all and any information regarding the sources or authors of 
the unauthorised disclosure of the Statements."0 4 The Court also asked the 
Croatian authorities to provide it with any information "regarding the identity 
of those potentially responsible for the illegal disclosure of the Statements and 
violations of the related orders and decisions of the Chamber regarding the 
protection of witnesses."105 Though, in this case, the Croatian authorities 
might be inclined to enforce the Tribunal's order-the protected witness 
allegedly is the current President of Croatia, Stjepan Mesic-it is easy to 
imagine cases where the local authorities would be less interested, or where 
the local government is simply dysfunctional and unable to comply. 10 6 With 
witnesses' lives at stake (a number have been killed or threatened), 10 7 the 
incapacity of international criminal courts to guarantee the efficacy of their 
protective orders has potential negative effects on the ability of defendants to 
present witnesses at trial. 
E. Enforcement 
Finally, what if Croatia fails to enforce the Blaskic Trial Chamber's 
order against the two newspapers, as it did when this same Trial Chamber 
issued a binding order against Croatia during the Blaskic trial? 10 8 What 
methods does the Court then have to enforce its own orders? A variety of 
methods are possible (for example, condemnation by the Security Council or 
individual states, financial incentives or disincentives, diplomatic and 
economic sanctions, and the use of force), 10 9 but here too the tribunals must 
rely on states." 0 And in doing so, they must, as Justice Goldstone has noted,
"only rely on the media and public opinion to increase pressure ... on those 
parties to act in a manner consistent with justice and morality.""' Sometimes 
states find it in their interest to exert influence on noncooperating states and 
this will often have an effect. Croatia's recent move toward cooperation with 
the ICTY, for example, is attributable in significant part to its eagerness to 
become integrated into the European economy; so too is Yugoslavia's thus far 
104. Blaskic Order,supranote 101. 
105. Id 
106. For a recount of the leaks, see Newspapers Risk Contempt of Court Charges: Croatian 
Newspapers Warned to Halt Publication of Mesic Statements, IWPR TRIBUNAL UPDATE, Dec. 4-9, 
2000, availableathttp://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/tri/tri-202-4_eng.txt. 
107. See, e.g., Carlotta Gall, A Croat'sKillingProdsAction on War Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2000, at 3. 
108. See supranote 58 and accompanying text. 
109. These are discussed in Michael P. Scharf, The ToolsforEnforcingInternationalCriminal 
Justice in the New Millennium:Lessonsfrom the Yugoslavia Tribunal,49 DEPAuL L. REV. 925, 933-37 
(2000) [hereinafter Toolsfor EnforcingInternationalCriminalJustice];see also Christopher C. Joyner, 
StrengtheningEnforcement ofHumanitarianLaw: Reflections on the InternationalCriminalTribunal 
for the FormerYugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79 (1995). 
110. For a discussion of remedies for noncompliance in the context of an order to produce 
documents in the Blaskic case, see Cogan, supranote 42, at 421 n.92. 
111. Cedric Thornberry, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal,FoREIGN PoL'Y, Fall 1996, at 83 
(quoting Justice Richard Goldstone). 
2002] FairTrials 
more limited cooperation following the fall of Milosevic. n 2 Still, what 
happens when the states that are relied upon to enforce ICTY orders (such as 
the United States) are themselves the noncompliant parties, as might have 
been the case if Todorovic had not been settled? Who enforces orders against 
the enforcers? In these situations, international criminal courts will likely do 
what other international tribunals often do: avoid issuing an order that risks 
noncompliance so that the court can retain the semblance of authority.
1 1 3 
F. Cooperation'sLimits 
As is apparent, the cooperation regime that undergirds international 
criminal courts significantly and systematically affects the ability of 
defendants to provide for their own defense.114 Defendants are limited by the 
structure of these courts in their ability to procure evidence and witnesses and 
to have orders issued on their behalf enforced, despite statutory and judicially 
imposed obligations on states. Moreover, defendants' opportunities for getting 
evidence, witnesses, and orders enforced are substantially less than those of 
the prosecutor, who has all the powers of her office, and often the sympathies 
of governments, on her side.115 All these difficulties pose potentially 
pernicious obstacles to the provision of fair trials. 
112. See Peter Finn, In Croatia,Laiv vs. Patriotism:Thousands RallyforEx-GeneralAccused 
of War Crimes,WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2001, at A21; Steven Erlanger & Carlotta Gall, Milosevic Arrest 
Came with Pledgefora FairTrial,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at Al. 
113. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISIoN: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 641-43 (1971). 
114. The problems faced by these courts in obtaining evidence from reluctant third-party states 
are not unique. They occur (with increasing frequency as states extend extraterritorially the jurisdiction 
of their criminal laws) whenever domestic courts prosecute persons for crimes involving acts committed 
in foreign states in the absence of mutual legal assistance treaties. See Post-Cold War International 
Security Threats: Terrorism,Drugs,andOrganizedCrime Symposium Transcript,21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 
655 (2000); see also Bruce Zagaris, Uncle Sam ExtendsReachforEvidence Worldwide, CRIM. JUSTICE, 
Winter 2001, at 4. Thus, before the adoption of the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
between Switzerland and the United States, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019 (entered into 
force Jan. 23, 1977), U.S. prosecutors had a difficult time procuring information covered by 
Switzerland's bank secrecy laws. See Lee Paikin, Problemsof ObtainingEvidence in Foreign Statesfor 
Use in FederalCriminalProsecutions,22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 233, 237 (1984); see also Roger 
M. Olsen, Discoveryin FederalCriminalInvestigations,16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 999 (1984). For 
the United States, the most recent example ofthis problem is the embassy bombings case, in which the 
acts took place in Kenya and Tanzania, neither of which have such treaties with the United States. Still, 
domestic courts (at least those from systems used as models for the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC) have 
significant advantages over international courts when they try to obtain information from third-party 
states. They also have advantages when they seek to obtain evidence from their own national security 
agencies. In the United States, for instance, the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-
16, provides pre-trial mechanisms for determining the relevance and means of disclosure of classified 
material. Even so, "greymail" cases (most infamously in the case of Oliver North) demonstrate the 
difficulty of providing fair trials under these circumstances. See Sandra D. Jordan, Classified 
Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions:Balancingthe Scales of JusticeAfter 
Iran-Contra,91 COLUM. L. REv. 1651, 1667-69 (1991); Christopher M. Maher, The Right to a Fair 
Trial in Criminal Cases Involving the Introduction of ClassifiedInformation, 120 MIL. L. REV. 83 
(1988); Richard P. Salgado, Note, Government Secrets, FairTrials, and the Classified Information 
ProceduresAct, 98 YALE L.J. 427 (1988). These sorts of cases, however, are the exception in domestic 
systems, whereas they are the norm for international criminal tribunals. 
115. See Sebastian Rotella, U.S.Lmvman's Trip to "Heartof Darkness," L.A. TIMES,Aug. 12, 
2001, at Al (describing the crucial assistance of U.S. intelligence agencies in the Krsticcase before the 
ICTY); Wladimiroff Rights of Suspects and Accused, supra note 13, at 443-46. The Office of the 
Prosecutor has a significant advantage in financial resources as well. A number of defendants have 
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V DIFFICULTIES: OUTSIDE INFLUENCE 
One might object at this point and say that, yes, it is more difficult for 
defendants to put on an adequate defense in international criminal courts, but 
it is not impossible. Indeed, whether these challenges are debilitatingly 
difficult (or much more difficult for the accused than for the prosecutor) is a 
matter for trial judges to decide on a case-by-case basis. These sorts of 
determinations, the argument might continue, are made all the time in 
domestic courts. This was essentially the judgment of the Scottish court in 
Lockerbie and the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic.116 The plea bargain in 
Todorovic, it could also be argued, was made in the shadow of a possible trial 
court decision granting Todorovic's motion for release if the evidence he 
sought could not have been produced. In other words, in all of these cases the 
system worked as it should have, and the promise of fair trials was kept, not 
broken. The Blaskic case, assuming the newly discovered evidence is 
exculpatory, may just be an exception and does not demonstrate the 
categorical inability of these courts to guarantee fair trials. 
Even if this is so, there are additional reasons to worry about fair trials 
that pertain to these courts' dependence on states for financing and judicial 
assistance, some examples of which we have already seen. In Blaskic, it seems 
apparent that the Croatian government refused to cooperate with the ICTY in 
order to affect the outcome of that trial. Similarly, the U.S. government 
resisted cooperating in Lockerbie, and perhaps in Todorovic as well. But state 
influence on judicial proceedings works not only at the individual case level. 
Such influence can also wend its way, more generally, into the manner in 
which these tribunals operate and make decisions. As the following examples 
from the ICTY and ICTR will suggest, this influence potentially impinges on 
their impartiality. 
A. Financingandthe InstitutionalDesire to Self-Perpetuate 
A good example is financing. International justice is not cheap and 
international criminal courts are dependent on states or international 
organizations for their funding. Both ad hoc tribunals receive their funding 
from the United Nations; the future International Criminal Court will collect 
recently argued that they receive inadequate funding to do their own investigations and that this violates 
the principle of equality of arms. Thus, in a May 2, 2001 motion, counsel for Radoslav Brdanin argued
that "[t]he Tribunal has not provided and is not prepared to provide sufficient resources to enable the 
defendant to properly and legally defend against the indictment in this case." Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Trial Chamber, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 2, 2001, available at http://www.intcrimlaw.com/ 
Section%20IV/Motion%2Oto%2ODismiss%20-%2Oresources.pdf On May 16, 2001, the pre-trial Judge,
David Hunt dismissed the motion, though he noted that "if it is demonstrated that the absence of such 
resources is likely to result in a miscarriage ofjustice," the Trial Chamber "has the inherent power and 
the obligation to stay the proceedings until the necessary resources are provided." Decision on Second 
Motion by Brdanin to Dismiss the Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Trial 
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 16, 2001, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/trialc/decision-e/10516DC215720.htm. There have been similar 
complaints as to the funding of defense counsel. See Vincent, supranote 100, at BI. 
116. Tadic Appeal,supranote 97, 55-56. 
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its allocation from assessments on the States Parties, or from the United 
Nations in the case ofa Security Council referral." 
7 
There are at least two possible pitfalls here. One is that these courts 
simply will not have the money to be effective because contributing states will 
be in arrears. n8 Another is that states will use their monetary leverage to 
influence the tribunals' work." 9 One need only look at the recent fracas over 
the U.S. dues owed the United Nations, in which the United States 
successfully conditioned its payment on U.N. reform, to appreciate how this 
might work.12 
Money's potential influence on international criminal courts is also 
related to these courts' institutional motivation to continue to exist. As Martin 
Bell, a former BBC correspondent and independent Member of Parliament, 
recently remarked, "I remain to be convinced that [Tihomir Blaskic] had a fair 
trial .... My concern has always been that there is a political pressure to 
deliver guilty verdicts, that if they come up with acquittal after acquittal 
people will say what is the point of this court?' '12' Bell's concern that 
international criminal courts have an inherent bias against defendants is a 
serious, if sensitive, matter. After all, these courts, unlike general jurisdiction 
domestic criminal courts, were set up for a specific purpose: to prosecute 
violators of international humanitarian law. It is perhaps this that led the 
ICTY's first president, Judge Antonio Cassese, to straddle the line between 
impartiality and prejudgment when he advocated the expulsion of Yugoslavia 
from the Atlanta Olympics for its failure to arrest Radovan Karadzic and 
Ratko Mladic, stating "It would be much better to arrest them now .... We 
must stop their political and military activities.' 22 Thus, despite the best 
inclinations of those involved, including judges, it is not too difficult to 
imagine that these courts could have an institutional bias against defendants 
because their continued existence depends on producing convictions.123 
117. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 115. 
118. For a discussion ofhow monetary shortfalls have affected the ICTY, see Scharf, Tools for 
Enforcing InternationalCriminal Justice, supra note 109, at 933-37. Cf Jenny S. Martinez; Troubles at 
the Tribunal, WAsH. POST, July 3, 2001, at A19 (noting that, even with plenty of money, the ICTY has 
come "dangerously close to being in the embarrassing position of violating international human rights 
norms on speedy trials"). 
119. Though domestic courts are also funded by governments (their own), the same worries do 
not apply to the same extent, at least in the national systems to which the international tribunals aspire. 
In these legal systems, the concept ofseparation of powers allows courts to maintain their independence. 
As yet, this does not apply in the international context. 
120. See Barbara Crossette, After Long Fight, U.N. Agrees to Cut Dues Paid by U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2000, at Al. 
121. Chris Stephen, British Officers "Clear" Bosnian War Criminal, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY 
(Edinburgh), Apr. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4011654. 
122. Alison Smale, Strong Demands to Arrest Bosnian Serb Leaders, ASsOcIATED PREss POL. 
SERV., June 13, 1996, available at 1996 WL 5388766. For criticisms of Cassese, see Geoffrey 
Robertson, War Crimes Deserve a Fair Trial, TIMES (London), June 25, 1996, at 20; and Thornberry, 
supra note 111, at 84. For a defense, see Olivia Q. Swaak-Goldman, The ICTY and the Right to a Fair 
Trial:A Critique of the Critics, 10 LEIDEtI J. INT'LL. 215, 215-17 (1997). 
123. Cf Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1995 (noting that the ICTY "is by nature 
mission-oriented, and missionaries, judges, prosecutors, and administrators, tend to form a sense of 
camaraderie and community"). Judges might also be influenced by their method of appointment. The 
judges of the two ad hoc tribunals are elected by the U.N. General Assembly for four-year, renewable 
terms. See S/RES/1329 (2000), amending SJRES/827 (1993), S/RES/995 (1994). The possibility of 
reelection can make judges more susceptible to political influence. In contrast, judges appointed to the 
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B. CooperationRevisited 
Another type of influence takes the form of political meddling. The most 
egregious recent example is the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, who is 
accused of six counts of violations of international humanitarian law 
stemming from his acts during the Rwandan genocide.124 Barayagwiza was a 
leader of the radical Hutu political party Coalition*for the Defense of the 
Republic, which advocated "Hutu Power," and one of the founders of 
Radiotilivision libre des milles collines, which incited hatred against the 
country's Tutsi population. 2 5 Once the extremists took control of the 
Rwandan government in early 1994, he became the director of political affairs 
in the Rwandan Foreign Ministry. 12 6 Barayagwiza, in short, is accused of 
being one of the architects of the propaganda machine that instigated the 
murder of more than 800,000 Rwandans.1
27 
It is Barayagwiza's prolonged pre-trial detention, however, rather than 
his alleged criminal acts, that has made headlines. On April 15, 1996, 
Barayagwiza, together with a number of other Rwandans, was arrested in 
Cameroon pursuant to international arrest warrants issued by Rwanda and 
Belgium, and, the next day, the ICTR Prosecutor also requested that he be 
held pending the Tribunal's decision as to whether to request his transfer to 
Arusha, Tanzania for prosecution. 128 On May 16, 1996, the ICTR Prosecutor 
notified Cameroon that it was no longer interested in Barayagwiza's transfer. 
Extradition proceedings continued from that date until February 17, 1997, 
when Cameroon's courts denied Rwanda's extradition request and ordered 
Barayagwiza's release. That same day, however, the ICTR Prosecutor again 
asked that he be held pending a decision on a transfer request. This time, on 
February 24, the Prosecutor decided to follow through on this request. An 
order for this was soon issued by the Cameroon courts on March 4, but 
Barayagwiza was not sent to Arusha until November 19, 1997. On February 
23, 1998, he pleaded not guilty to all counts lodged against him. The next day, 
February 24, 1998, Barayagwiza filed an "extremely urgent motion" that 
sought to throw out his arrest because, inter alia, he had been illegally 
detained. The Court's Trial Chamber denied the motion, 29 but on November 
3, 1999, the Appeals Chamber reversed the lower court, found for 
Barayagwiza, and ordered that he be returned to Cameroon because the length 
ICC will serve a nine-year, nonrenewable term, making them, at least in this way, less susceptible. See 
Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 36. 
124. Amended Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Apr. 11, 2000. 
125. Id 
126. Id 
127. On the media and the Rwandan genocide, see, for example, Frank Chalk, HateRadio in 
Rwanda, in THE PATH OF A GENOCIDE: THE RWANDA CRISIS FROM UGANDA TO ZAIRE 93 (Howard 
Adelman & Astri Suhrke eds., 1999); and ARTICLE 19, BROADCASTING GENOCIDE: CENSORSHIP, 
PROPAGANDA & STATr-SPONSORED VIOLENCE INRWANDA, 1990-1994 (1996). 
128. This summary of the facts is based on the decisions of the court, see infra notes 130, 134, 
and William A. Schabas, Case Note, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2000). 
129. See Decision on the Extremely Urgent Motion by the Defense for Orders to Review and/or 
Nullify the Arrest and Provisional Detention of the Suspect, The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 17, 1998, availableat 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/RELEASEI 198.htm. 
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of his detention had been far beyond what international human rights 
standards allow. 130 The Court commented, "[n]othing less than the integrity of 
the Tribunal is at stake in this case. Loss ofpublic confidence in the Tribunal, 
as a court valuing human rights of all individuals-including those charged 
with unthinkable crimes-would be among the most serious consequences of 
allowing [Barayagwiza] to stand trial in the face of such violations of his 
rights.'' 
Livid, Rwanda suspended cooperation with the ICTR, thereby 
effectively halting all of the Tribunal's investigations. 132 Rwanda refused to 
grant a visa to the Tribunal's chief prosecutor, and one of the ICTR's trials 
had to be postponed because Rwanda refused to allow sixteen Rwandan 
witnesses to travel to the Court to testify.133 Faced with the very real 
possibility that ICTR would disintegrate under her watch, Carla Del Ponte, the 
Chief Prosecutor, assured the Rwandan government that she would do 
everything in her power to convince the Appeals Chamber to reverse its 
decision. On November 19, 1999, she notified the Court ofher intention to ask 
it to review or reconsider its ruling, and she submitted such a motion on 
December 1, citing new facts. 134 Shortly before the review hearing took place, 
Rwanda said it would resume its cooperation with the Tribunal. 3 5 Rwanda's 
renewed cooperation, however, was conditional. At the hearing before the 
Appeals Chamber on February 22, 2000, the Attorney General of Rwanda, as 
amicus curiae, "openly threatened the non co-operation of the peoples of 
Rwanda with the Tribunal if faced with an unfavourable Decision by the 
Appeals Chamber on the Motion for Review.', 
136 
On March 31, 2000, the Appeals Chamber reversed its earlier decision. 
Though Barayagwiza's rights had been violated by prolonged pretrial 
detention, the panel concluded, the new facts brought to light by the 
Prosecutor in her review motion mitigated the severity of that violation so the 
remedy of release was no longer appropriate.137 The judges denied that they 
had been coerced into changing their decision to release Barayagwiza, 138 but it 
is likely that Rwanda's threats played a part in the outcome. 139 
130. See Decision, The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Appeals Chamber, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 3, 1999, T 113, available at http://www.ictr.org/ 
ENGLISH/cases/B arayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.htm. 
131. Id1112. 
132. See Emmanuel Goujon, Rwanda Suspends Cooperation with Genocide Court over 
Release, AGENCEFRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 6, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 25139194. 
133. See Rwanda Bars UN. TribunalProsecutor; Visa Refused After CourtFreed Genocide 
Suspect, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1999, at A24. 
134. Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration, Barayagwiza v. The 
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Mar. 31, 2000, 1 6-7, 13, 15, availableat http://www.ictr.orgENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/ 
decisionsldcs2000033 1.htm [hereinafter BarayagwizaReview Decision]. 
135. See Hrvoje Hranjsld, Rwanda Renews U.N. Tribunal Ties, AP ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2000, 
availableat2000 WL 12390478. 
136. BarayagwizaReview Decision,supranote 134, 1 12, 34. 
137. Id 74-75. 
138. See id 1 34; Declaration of Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia, Decision on Prosecutor's Request 
for Review or Reconsideration, Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals 
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Mar. 31, 2000, 1 7, available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwizaldecisions/separate31032000.htm; Separate Opinion 
of Judge Shahabuddeen, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration, Barayagwiza 
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C. Courts and Politics
Dependency binds these ad hoc tribunals in clear ways. Though the
choice between limiting the rights of the accused and facing the risk oflosing 
the ability to conduct trials at all is seldom as clear or as public as in 
Barayagwiza, this bind must pervade decision-making, to some degree, in 
these tribunals. Defendants, therefore, are not onllo at a disadvantage in
procuring the necessary materials for their defense. 1 0 They can also be at a
disadvantage when a court needs to decide whether they have been accorded 
the rights they are due, whether they have received a fair trial, or, indeed, 
whether they are guilty or innocent. VI. PROSPECTS
As we have seen, the cooperation regime, as experienced by the ad hoc 
tribunals, can be in tension with basic fair trial rights. Chief Prosecutor Del 
Ponte demonstrated this point most clearly, albeit unintentionally, when, at 
oral argument in the rehearing in Barayagwiza, she told the Appeals Chamber 
that: Whether we want it or not, we must come to terms with the fact that our ability to continue with our prosecution and investigations depend on the government of Rwanda. That is the reality that we face. [Either Barayagwiza is tried by the Tribunal or sent to Rwanda to be tried there.] Otherwise I am afraid . .. [that we can] open [the door] of the 
141prison [and let everyone go].
To its credit, the Appeals Chamber resisted Del Ponte's conclusion, but the 
problem she identified exists for the tribunals just the same, and the more so 
for the defendant than for the Chief Prosecutor. In order for international 
criminal courts to better provide for fair trials, either the cooperation regime v.The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda, Mar. 31, 2000, 11 71-72, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/separate31032000.htm; Declaration of Judge Lal Chand Vohrah, Decision (Prosecutor'sRequest for Review or Reconsideration), Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72,Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Mar. 31, 2000, 1 3, available athttp://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/separate3 l 032000.htm.139. Another rare public threat was made in March 1999 by the Belgian embassy in Tanzaniawhen the !CTR refused to hand over Bernard Ntuyahaga, a former Rwandan army officer who was accused of participating in the murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers, after the Tribunal dropped charges against him. The Belgian government, in addition to threatening to review its cooperation with the Tribunal, tried to arrange a meeting with the U.N. Secretary-General to discuss the Tribunal's handling of the case. PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS, AND THE UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 68 (2000). Consider also the testimony of Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director of the Coalition for International Justice, before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See Accountability for War Crimes: Progress and Prospects: Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., May 11, 1999, at 25, available at http://www.csce.gov/pdf.cfm?file 05l 199.pdf ("[These tribunals] have to recognize . . .  that even=though they should make prosecutorial decisions independent of political considerations, and make their determinations in an unbiased legal and just way, they are wholly dependent on the cooperation of states in order to execute their orders ... . [T]hey ultimately have to rely on political institutions. They have to go to countries for intelligence information, go to countries for apprehension."). 140. See supra Part IV.141. Declaration of Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia, supra note 138, 12 (quoting Chief ProsecutorDel Ponte). 
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must be made to work, or additional procedures must be put in place to protect 
the accused. 
In the case of the ad hoc tribunals, the cooperation regime's weakness 
does not result from the absence of tribunal authority or an authoritative 
enforcement mechanism. Both the ICTY and ICTR were created by the 
Security Council pursuant to its Chapter VII authority. States are thus under 
an obligation to cooperate with the tribunals, and the Security Council could 
conceivably decide to take measures against states that failed to comply with 
the tribunals' orders. Despite occasional pleas by the ICTY, however, the 
Security Council has failed to take such action. 142 Individual states and 
regional organizations, though, have used various forms of persuasion to 
encourage states, in particular Yugoslavia and Croatia, to cooperate, and this 
has worked in a limited fashion. But, even backed by the enforcement 
authority of the Security Council and certain powerful states, the tribunals, as 
demonstrated, have not always been able to provide for defendants. In fact, 
the very reliance on such states may itself create fair trial problems. 
If the experience of the ad hoc tribunals should make proponents of 
international justice wary of possibilities of fair trials, it is, therefore, 
worthwhile to ask if the future permanent International Criminal Court is an 
improvement on its predecessors. The answer is "no." In contrast to the ad hoc 
tribunals, the ICC is backed by the Rome Statute, not the U.N. Charter, and, 
thus, only those states that ratify the Rome Statute will be bound by the ICC's 
orders. Moreover, instead of the Security Council, only an Assembly of States 
Parties will normally have the formal authority to enforce the ICC's orders 
and keep states in compliance. As a result, it is safe to expect that the ICC will 
have greater difficulties providing defendants with fair trials than the ad hoc 
tribunals-except, perhaps, in extraordinary cases where there is international 
political consensus. 
In the absence of an effective mechanism that will ensure the 
performance of a state's duties to cooperate with international criminal courts, 
these courts, themselves, will need to take affirmative steps to protect the 
accused. They should amend (or should have amended) their statutes and rules 
of procedure and evidence so that they are more sympathetic to the inherent 
difficulties faced by the accused in the formation of his or her defense. 143 
Thus, the ad hoc tribunals should adopt a rule that gives defendants the same 
power as the prosecution to secure evidence and witnesses. 144 The tribunals 
and the future ICC should also adopt a rule that states that, when an order 
issued on behalf of the defendant for the production of evidence is met with 
noncompliance, the burden is on the prosecutor to show that the missing 
142. For a review and discussion of Security Council enforcement of ICTY judicial orders, see 
Daryl A. Mundis, Reporting Non-Compliance: Rule 7bis, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PRocEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE, supranote 25, at 421. 
143. The procedures for amending the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence are 
stated in articles 51, 121-123 ofthe Rome Statute, supranote 9. The procedures for amending the Rules 
of the ICTY and ICTR appear in article 15 of the ICTY Statute, supranote 33, and article 14 of the 
ICTR Statute, supranote 33. 
144. See Wladimiroff, Rights of Suspects and Accused, supra note 13, at 445. The Rome 
Statute is an improvement in this regard. 
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evidence was not material to a proper defense.145 Though the adoption of such 
a presumption might, counterproductively, encourage states that had an 
interest in the accused being set free to resist a court's order, it would clarify 
for all to see the degree of importance of the evidence withheld. Moreover, 
this presumption would serve to encourage other states interested in a 
successful prosecution to exert more influence on the noncooperating state. 
Furthermore, judges on these courts should do more to view the 
substantive rights of the accused through the prism of the structural limitations 
on these courts. Such a contextual approach would allow judges to expand the 
rights of the accused to take into account the difficulties inherent in 
international criminal defense. To this extent, the recent decision of the 
Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic on the reconsideration of factual findings 
where additional evidence has been admitted on appeal is a disappointment.1
46 
Though the Appeals Chamber recognized "the numerous practical difficulties 
that all parties at trial before the Tribunal face in locating all relevant 
witnesses and documentary evidence from distant countries, not always co-
operative with the Tribunal," and noted the "real danger of a miscarriage of 
justice when a Trial Chamber is deprived of crucial evidence relating to the 
guilt or innocence of an accused that does not surface until the trial is 
completed,"'147 the Court adopted a standard that makes it difficult to overturn 
a verdict, even with the introduction of new and probative evidence. 
148 
These courts should also provide criminal defense attorneys with better 
resources, which might allow them to overcome some of the difficulties 
encountered in investigations. 149 There is already a movement to create a 
formal international defense bar, which will help professionalize the 
representation of the accused.150 The courts themselves will also need to 
provide more money and, through their registries, provide more guidance 
(legal and investigative) to assist defense counsel.151 A more formal presence 
for the defense within the structure of these courts will also increase the 
likelihood of fair trials. 
52 
145. As is, the burden is on the accused. Article 72(7)(a)(iii) and (b)(ii) of the Rome Statute 
allows the Court to "make such inference in the trials of the accused as to the existence or non-existence 
of a fact, as may be appropriate in the circumstances," but does not designate which party carries the 
burden. Rome Statute, supranote 9. 
146. See Appeal Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeals 
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 23, 2001, available at 
http://www.un.orgictylkupreskiclappealljudgementlkup-ajOl 1023e.pdf. 
147. 1d 144. 
148. Id 75. To the Appeals Chamber's credit, it defended the right to a fair trial in other 
aspects of its decision, i 100, and ultimately reversed the convictions of three ofthe defendants and 
revised downward the sentences oftwo others. klpt. X. 
149. See supranote 115 and accompanying text; Howard Morrison, The QuestforJustice:Will 
the Mighty Prosecution Steamroller Overwhelm the Push-Bike Resources of the Defence at the 
InternationalCriminalCourts?, COUNSEL (London), June 2001, at 14. 
150. See INTERNATONAL CRIMINAL DEFENCE BAR ATTORNEYS ASS'N, ICDAA ANNUAL 
REPORT 2000, at 12 (2001), available at http://www.hri.calpartners/aiad-icdaa/reports 
Annual%20Reportl.pdf. 
151. Rule 20 of the finalized draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Court provide for the ICC Registry to give such support. The text is available at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statuterules/rulemain.htm. 
152. For a fuller argument, see Elise Groulx, The Defence Pillar: Making the Defence a Full 
Partner in the International Criminal Justice System, Nov. 3, 2000, available at http://www.hri.cal 
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Finally, observer-participants (scholars, activists, and the press) should 
do better than they have as "watchdogs" on fair trials, sniffing out injustice to 
the internationally-accused and working to keep all the relevant actors on their 
toes. As Judge Cassese has noted, "it is not enough for the International 
Tribunal simply to administer international criminal justice impartially and 
with due regard for the rights of the accused. It must also carry out this 
activity under the scrutiny of the international community."' 153 The current 
watchdog-absent context 154 works to the detriment of defendants, allowing 
states to influence, and judges to be influenced. If court proponents truly want 
these courts' decisions to be considered authoritative declarations of 
international human rights law, they would do well to speak more of the rights 
of the accused. 
Those most interested in promoting the rights of the accused-defense 
counsel, the accused and their families, and some of the states that have 
nationals among the accused-have already done work along these lines. 
Unfortunately, however, the same tendencies that make fair trials difficult in 
these courts also decrease the possibility that these mitigating strategies will 
be adopted in a meaningful way. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
International criminal courts have it difficult. International actors 
withhold evidence. They restrict access to evidence. They refuse to allow 
witnesses to testify. They decline to enforce or abide byjudicial orders. They 
silently coerce courts by threatening to withdraw support. To recognize all 
these obstacles is not necessarily to prejudge the ability of international 
criminal courts to hold persons accountable for violations of international 
humanitarian law.155 It is simply to suggest that international criminal courts 
run the risk that fair trials can be a casualty of this pursuit, and that there is no 
reason to believe that this predicament will change when the permanent 
International Criminal Court comes into existence-in fact, just the156 
opposite. 
Because of the publicity it will garner, some say that the first true test of 
contemporary international criminal courts will be the trial of former 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Doubters wonder if states will be as 
willing to cooperate with the defense (assuming Milosevic mounts one) as 
with the prosecution.157 They also question whether the Tribunal's judges will 
partners/aiad-icdaa/reports/defencepillar.htm. 
153. Antonio Cassese, Foreword, INT'LREv. RED CROss, No. 321, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 602. 
154. See supranotes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
155. Such recognition should not be considered a reason to ignore the good that these tribunals 
achieve, nor to say that the statutory rights of the accused are deficient, nor to condemn the trials as 
victors' justice, nor to condemn the enterprise ofinternational prosecutions per se. 
156. One might say that it will take time for these courts to reflect a level of excellence that has 
taken most domestic courts a long time to attain, and that it is unreasonable to expect perfection at this 
stage ofthe development of international criminal justice. To do so, the argument might continue, would 
be to impose an unattainable standard and, thereby, make the establishment of international criminal 
courts impossible. This, though, is a concession that these courts might not be able to provide fair trials; 
whether we might want to create such courts, in any event, is another (albeit related) question. 
157. See, e.g., Aleksa Djilas, The PoliticizedTribunal, IWPR TRmBuNAL UPDATE (July 16-21, 
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be brave enough to order the CIA and other intelligence services to reveal 
information that might be damaging to them and their governments. Will 
states, in other words, give Milosevic evidence that might inculpate or 
embarrass their own leaders? 
This Article suggests that the Milosevic proceedings are not a true test: 
when states are interested in providing for fair trials, they will take place; and 
when sufficient publicity is focused on courts, judges will make sure that 
every procedural nicety and right is observed. There exists an excellent chance 
that Milosevic will receive a fair trial, and every indication from the pre-trial 
proceedings is evidence that this is the course that the trial will take. For this 
reason, Milosevic's trial is anomalous-a poor paradigm for how these courts 
have functioned in the past, and how they might operate in the future. The real 
challenge is not the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, but rather how to devise a 
method to ensure that every defendant standing before an international 
criminal court will receive the same fair treatment as Milosevic. 
2001), availableat http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/tri/tri-230_2_eng.txt. 
